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DUN & BRADSTREET REVISITED — A COMMENT ON
LEVINE AND WERMIEL
Scott L. Nelson*
Lee Levine and Stephen Wermiel’s account of the internal history of
the Supreme Court’s decision in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc.1 convincingly demonstrates the utility of the papers of
retired Justices in facilitating a painstaking reconstruction of the Court’s
deliberations. As someone who clerked for Justice Byron White in the
October 1984 and 1985 Terms and was thus present during the second of
the two years in which the Court considered Dun & Bradstreet,2 I will
not comment on the accuracy of the particular details the Article reports
or add any inside information about the Court’s deliberations. That
would be both improper and impossible. Improper because a law clerk
has a duty of confidentiality both toward his or her Justice and toward
the Court as an institution; and impossible because, not having worked
on the case myself, I have only fuzzy recollections concerning the many
twists and turns the Article describes, and certainly none that match the
wealth of detail the authors have gleaned from the documentary record.
I will, however, try to situate the case within the broader context of
the issues before the Court during the 1984 Term, which may give the
reader a more accurate perspective from which to judge whether the
story of Dun & Bradstreet is that of a doctrinal perfect storm or a
* Scott L. Nelson is a senior attorney with Public Citizen Litigation Group in Washington, D.C.,
where he has a broad public-interest practice including litigation before the Supreme Court of the
United States. Before joining Public Citizen, he was a partner in the Washington, D.C., law firm
Miller, Cassidy, Larroca & Lewin. He was a law clerk to the Honorable Byron R. White during the
1984 and 1985 terms of the Supreme Court. The author would like to express his thanks to the
editors of the Washington Law Review for their assistance in preparing this piece for publication.
1. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
2. Unlike Levine and Wermiel, and my fellow commenters, I refer to the case as Dun &
Bradstreet, not Greenmoss Builders. That is what I recall the case being called at the time it was
reargued; that is how the Court has referred to it on the very few occasions when a later opinion has
cited it more than once, for example, Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215–16
(2011); and that is how I have always thought of it. I am going against the flow on this point not
because I think one way of referring to the case is more correct than the other, but for purely
personal reasons. For me, it would feel unnatural to call the case anything but Dun & Bradstreet.
Perhaps, like Justice White at times, I am simply “out of step.” See infra note 68 and accompanying
text.
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tempest in a teapot—or, perhaps more likely, something in between. I
will also comment on the usefulness of the sources relied on by the
authors in creating an accurate picture of the Court’s workings. Finally, I
will offer some brief observations on the issues in Dun & Bradstreet, the
problems it posed for the Court, and the decision’s place in the evolution
of the Court’s First Amendment libel jurisprudence.
I.

CONTEXT: THE SUPREME COURT’S 1984 TERM

Levine and Wermiel understandably present Dun & Bradstreet as a
story of considerable drama, with large issues, including the fate of New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan,3 hanging in the balance. The case’s odd
history, including its reargument and the apparent change in outcome
that transformed Justice Powell’s opinion from a dissent to a plurality
opinion announcing the Court’s judgment, as well as the fundamental
issues raised by Justice White’s concurrence, lends itself to that
portrayal. Such a case, readers of their Article might understandably
conclude, must have been one of the focal points of the Term when it
was reargued, much like last Term’s decision in National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius,4 in which the Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act and, according to leaks
reported in the press, the Court’s deliberations led to considerable rancor
among the Justices.
But perhaps not. Sebelius was one of only sixty-four signed opinions
issued by the Court in cases briefed and argued on the merits in the
October 2011 Term, and it towered in practical, political, and doctrinal
importance over most of the other cases on the Court’s docket. That is
not to say that there were not other important and interesting cases in the
2011 Term, but much of the Court’s small docket was taken up by small
cases, half of which were decided unanimously or with only a single
dissent.5
By contrast, in the October 1984 Term, the Court disposed of a
whopping 139 cases by signed opinions. And Dun & Bradstreet does not
stand out now in retrospect, nor did it stand out at the time, as the
3. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
4. __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
5. See October Term 2011 – Granted and Noted List, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S. (June 29,
2012),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/grantednotedlist.aspx?Filename=11grantednotedlist.html (case
list of October Term 2011 opinions); 2011 Term Opinions of the Court, SUPREME COURT OF THE
U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/slipopinions.aspx?Term=11 (last visited Mar. 1, 2013)
(follow the links to case names to determine how the Justices voted in each opinion).
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leading case of the Term or even close to it. Although the 1984 Term
was not dominated by any one landmark case like Sebelius, the Term
featured a wealth of important decisions in a wide range of areas, and
many of them divided the Court at least as deeply as Dun & Bradstreet
did.
A few examples, somewhat arbitrarily chosen, will illustrate the
breadth of the business conducted by the Court in the 1984 Term.
Criminal procedure and death penalty cases were a major focus of the
Burger Court, and the Term featured a number of prominent examples:
Oregon v. Elstad,6 concerning the fruits of Miranda violations;
Wainwright v. Witt,7 rejecting a Sixth Amendment challenge to the use
of “death qualified” jurors to determine guilt in capital cases; and Ake v.
Oklahoma,8 establishing that indigent capital defendants have a right to
state-paid psychiatric experts when necessary to their defense.
Establishment Clause cases were also a major feature of the 1984 Term,
with decisions including Wallace v. Jaffree,9 the “moment of silence”
case; Aguilar v. Felton10 and School District of City of Grand Rapids v.
Ball,11 both striking down aid to parochial schools (and both later
overruled by the Rehnquist Court12); and Thornton v. Caldor,13 holding
unconstitutional a state statute that gave preferential rights to Sabbath
observing employees. Other major cases in the 1984 Term included
Mitchell v. Forsyth,14 allowing interlocutory appeals of decisions
denying qualified immunity to public officials sued for constitutional
violations; Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,15 a
milestone in the Court’s developing jurisprudence, favoring the
enforcement of arbitration agreements; Tennessee v. Garner,16 holding
that the Fourth Amendment limits the use of deadly force by law
enforcement officers; Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill,17
rejecting Justice Rehnquist’s effort to create a “bitter with the sweet”

6. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
7. 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
8. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
9. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
10. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
11. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
12. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
13. 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
14. 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
15. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
16. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
17. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).

06 - Nelson Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

3/18/2013 4:24 PM

106

[Vol. 88:103

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

doctrine limiting procedural due process rights; Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz,18 concerning due process limitations on the assertion of
personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants; Heckler v. Chaney,19
sharply curtailing judicial review of agency enforcement discretion; City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,20 applying rational basis review
with teeth under the Equal Protection Clause to strike down
discrimination against the disabled; and County of Oneida v. Oneida
Indian Nation,21 allowing Indian land claims litigation to proceed.
Even in the area of freedom of speech, Dun & Bradstreet did not
particularly stand out as among the most important cases of the Term.
Competing for that title would be Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel,22 a major commercial speech case striking down limits on
attorney advertising; Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises,23 rejecting a claim of fair use and First Amendment
protection for the appropriation of copyrighted material of public
interest; Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc.,24
limiting First Amendment rights to expression in a “nonpublic forum”
created by the government; Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc.,25 further
refining the Court’s definition of obscenity and distinguishing the
appropriate uses of facial and as-applied challenges; FEC v. National
Conservative Political Action Committee,26 striking down limits on
expenditures by political action committees; In re Snyder,27 holding that
an attorney may not be disciplined for writing a letter criticizing a
court’s handling of a request for attorney’s fees; and Lowe v. SEC,28
limiting the application of securities laws to newsletters and other
publications.
Indeed, among the three cases in which the Court announced on July
5, 1984, that it would hear reargument in the October 1984 Term—Dun
& Bradstreet, New Jersey v. T.L.O.,29 and Garcia v. San Antonio
18. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
19. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
20. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
21. 470 U.S. 226 (1985).
22. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
23. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
24. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
25. 472 U.S. 491 (1985).
26. 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
27. 472 U.S. 634 (1985).
28. 472 U.S. 181 (1985).
29. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
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Metropolitan Transit Authority30—Dun & Bradstreet was the one with
the lowest profile. The narrow questions on which the Court solicited
reargument in Dun & Bradstreet stood in marked contrast to the
questions implicated in the other two cases: what standards apply to
searches and seizures in the public schools (T.L.O.), and whether the
Court’s abortive foray into revitalizing the Tenth Amendment in
National League of Cities v. Usery31 should be overruled (Garcia). Of
course, had the Court requested reargument in Dun & Bradstreet about
whether Times v. Sullivan should be overruled, the relative importance
of the cases would have appeared rather different. But that was not the
question actually posed by the Court, nor does it appear from the now
publicly available record of the Court’s deliberations that any of the
Justices other than Justice White (and, in response, Justice Brennan)
viewed the case as really presenting that question.
None of this, of course, is intended to contradict Levine and
Wermiel’s careful tracing of the documentary history of the case. Nor is
it meant to suggest that the case was not viewed as very important by
Justice Brennan and his law clerks, as the written history compiled by
the Brennan Chambers clearly indicates; by Justice Powell, who appears
from the documents cited in the Article to have been deeply engaged in
the case and in the not entirely successful struggle to articulate a
coherent rationale for affirmance; and by Justice White, who seems from
the record to have vacillated about the outcome before deciding to use
the case to toss a grenade (or, perhaps more accurately, a cherry bomb,
given its inefficacy) at Times v. Sullivan.
Nonetheless, the Article may subtly overstate the degree to which the
case was a dramatic focal point of the Term. The sheer number of other
important (and also not-so-important) cases competing for the attention
of the Court suggests that it was not. And even the records cited by the
authors do not seem to indicate that the rest of the Court felt the same
degree of interest in the case as the three protagonists. What had become
by that time something of a liberal bloc—Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun,
and Stevens—lined up dutifully behind their leader (notwithstanding the
qualms Marshall had earlier expressed about extending Times v.
Sullivan,32 and the similar reservations that would lead Stevens to dissent
the next Term in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps33), and their

30. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
31. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
32. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 78 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
33. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
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involvement seems to have been largely confined to Justice Stevens’s
wise counsel that Brennan should not get too carried away by the idea
that the case was some kind of referendum on Times v. Sullivan.34
Meanwhile, the conservatives—Burger, Rehnquist, and O’Connor—
backed the outcome favored by Powell, though the documentary record
indicates that Burger (typically) cared little how the Court got there; that
Rehnquist seems to have been bemused by the thought that Powell, as
the author of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,35 would suddenly have qualms
about constitutionalizing libel law; and that O’Connor played a role
similar to that of Stevens on the other side, counseling a way to get the
case over with a minimum of additional fuss.36 Thus, another reading of
the record cited by Levine and Wermiel is that for the Court as a whole,
the case was not a matter of huge significance, but rather one that was
more trouble than it was worth, and probably of less interest than much
of the rest of the Court’s business that Term.
II.

THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD PROVIDED BY THE
FORMER JUSTICES’ PUBLICLY AVAILABLE PAPERS

The point I have just made is one about matters of importance and
emphasis, not accuracy. For me, one of the principal contributions of
Levine and Wermiel’s Article is that it illustrates the degree to which the
publicly available papers of the Burger Court’s Justices allow—for
better or for worse, depending on one’s views of the importance of
confidentiality versus openness of such deliberative processes—an
almost complete account of the Court’s internal deliberations over cases
it decided, from the certiorari stage through decision on the merits.
At the certiorari stage, the primary documents that allow insight into
the considerations that may have shaped the Court’s decision to grant
review of a case are the law clerks’ “pool memos.” Pool memos are
memoranda discussing each petition for certiorari filed with the Court,
which were prepared in each case by one of the law clerks for the six
Justices (Burger, White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor)
who participated in the “cert pool” at that time. Copies of those memos
were circulated to each of the Justices in the pool, and complete sets
appear to be available in the publicly available papers of several of the
34. Lee Levine & Stephen Wermiel, The Landmark that Wasn’t: A First Amendment Play in Five
Acts, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1, 87–89 (2013).
35. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
36. Levine & Wermiel, supra note 34, at 47, 86–89 (Burger), 39, 73–74 (Rehnquist), 60–63, 71
(O’Connor).
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Justices. The copies of the pool memos retained by each of the
participating chambers will differ slightly because of annotations by the
Justices’ law clerks and the Justices themselves. These annotations
provide additional insights about the views of a case in particular
chambers. Accounts of actual discussion of certiorari petitions by the
Justices in Conference are likely to be sketchy at best, but in cases (such
as Dun & Bradstreet) where there were not four votes to grant certiorari
the first time a petition was discussed, additional insights into the
Court’s decision-making process may be gleaned from drafts of dissents
from denial of certiorari, which were circulated to all the Justices and
often served as advocacy pieces seeking to sway enough votes to result
in a grant of certiorari.
In cases set for argument before the Court, some preliminary insights
into the Justices’ deliberations may be derived from bench memoranda
prepared by the Justices’ law clerks, and in some cases preargument
memoranda prepared by the Justices themselves. But not all Justices
received bench memoranda in all cases, and such memoranda, even
where they exist, are unreliable as indicia of the positions of the Justices,
as the law clerks’ views of a case might differ completely from those of
their Justices. Nonetheless, those memoranda, together with the
recordings and transcripts of arguments before the Court (which
unfortunately during that era did not identify the Justices who posed
particular questions to the advocates), may provide some clues about the
evolution of the Justices’ thinking leading up to the Conferences at
which they discussed and voted on the cases.
The Court’s practice in the 1984 Term was to hear four one-hour
arguments a day, Monday through Wednesday, during the two weeks of
each sitting. The Court voted on cases argued on Mondays at a
Conference held after the completion of arguments on Wednesday
afternoon, and voted on the Tuesday and Wednesday cases at the Friday
Conference where petitions for certiorari were also considered. The
Conferences, attended only by the Justices, are something of a black
box, as there were no witnesses and no official record was kept of the
Justices’ deliberations. Each Justice kept his or her own notes, more or
less elaborate; Justice White’s generally consisted simply of vote tallies
for each case scribbled in pencil on small pieces of paper. Apparently,
Justices Powell and Brennan kept more elaborate notes, and other
Justices may have done so as well; and Justice Brennan appears to have
given his clerks accounts of what was said that appear in their histories
of the Term (about which more later). Notwithstanding the availability
of these sources, reconstruction of Conferences is probably one of the
least reliable elements of any attempt to write a history of the Court’s
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consideration of a case. Fortunately, it is also probably not the most
important aspect of such a history, as the Justices tended to flesh out
their views in the opinion-writing process that followed, rather than in
the necessarily abbreviated discussions in the Conferences, at which the
Court had to address multiple cases in fairly limited amounts of time.
Following the Conference at which the Justices cast their initial votes
on a case, much of the critical action revealed itself in documents that
went to all the Justices. Such memoranda were typically addressed to
“the Conference,” which in the parlance of the Court at the time meant
the nine Justices collectively. The outcome of the Court’s vote can
generally be inferred by the memorandum from the senior Justice in the
majority assigning the majority opinion, which usually circulated a day
or two after the final Conference of each sitting. Initial opinion drafts
exchanged between the Justices and their law clerks were of course
generally not circulated beyond chambers, and may or may not now be
available in the papers of the writing Justice, depending on the document
retention practices of the particular Justice and, perhaps, on the
happenstance of whether a law clerk discarded a marked-up draft after
entering changes into the document on the word processing system used
by the Court at the time. Finished drafts, however, were sent to the
Court’s printer to be typeset and then circulated in page-proof form to
the Conference. Memoranda joining or commenting on draft opinions
were also circulated to the Conference, as were memoranda expressing
the intention to draft a dissenting or concurring opinion (or to await an
anticipated draft of a separate opinion from another Justice). Separate
opinions, once drafted, were also printed and circulated to the
Conference, as were the resulting revisions and counter-revisions that
followed. The general circulation of these items ensures that a fairly
complete record can be pieced together from the papers now publicly
available.
As the records of the Dun & Bradstreet case reviewed by Levine and
Wermiel demonstrate, a Justice sometimes sent a memorandum
commenting on the issues posed by an opinion only to one or two other
Justices (or added a handwritten addendum to one Justice’s copy of a
memorandum otherwise circulated to the Conference as a whole). The
Article cites examples where such privately exchanged memoranda
contained substantive comments on opinions that were perhaps more
detailed or candid than appropriate for circulation to the Conference. I
believe that, at least in the 1984–86 timeframe, such memoranda were
much rarer than those that went to the Conference, and often their
content would be reflected in some form in follow-up memoranda to the
Conference and/or in revisions to circulated opinions. Nonetheless, as
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the Dun & Bradstreet case illustrates, access to such private memoranda,
such as the O’Connor–Powell and Stevens–Brennan memos cited by
Levine and Wermiel,37 may be critical to understanding the evolution of
the Justices’ thinking and the resulting opinions. Fortunately, the papers
of enough of the Justices from that era are now publicly available that
the likelihood that either the author’s or the recipient’s copy will be in
one of the available sets of papers is fairly high.
What the paper record does not necessarily reflect, of course, is the
role that telephone conversations or face-to-face meetings between the
Justices may have played in shaping the outcomes of cases and the
evolution of opinions. Except in a few famous (reputed) instances that
have come to light as a result of ostensible leaks of some kind—such as
the account in The Brethren of a lunch meeting between Justices
Brennan, Stewart, and White at a now-defunct Washington, D.C.,
restaurant called the Market Inn, at which the Justices supposedly
“conspired” to take over the opinion in United States v. Nixon,38 which
Chief Justice Burger had assigned to himself39—such person-to-person
interactions of the Justices will for the most part necessarily be lost to
history. (As an aside, I note that Justice White enjoyed taking his law
clerks, and sometimes their parents, to lunch or dinner at the Market Inn
and on more than one occasion of which I am aware, loudly stated in the
presence of outsiders that “that table” or “that booth” was the one where
he, Potter Stewart, and “Billy” Brennan had conspired to take the
opinion in Nixon from the Chief Justice, sometimes adding, “if you can
believe what it says in The Brethren.”)40
However, my own observation of the Court and that, I believe, of
most of my contemporaries, was that substantive conversations among
the Justices outside of formal Conferences were surprisingly rare and far
less common than written communications. And, as the papers
canvassed by Levine and Wermiel demonstrate, even when these
conversations occurred they were often confirmed by or referenced in
subsequent memoranda. For the most part, then, the primary documents
now available in the public papers of the Justices—that is, the
contemporaneous drafts and memoranda, both internal to their chambers
and circulated to the Conference or to specific colleagues—provide the
37. Levine & Wermiel, supra note 34, at 83–84 (Stevens), 60–62, 71–72 (O’Connor).
38. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
39. BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 322–
28 (1979).
40. See also Stephen McAllister, Justice Byron White and The Brethren, 15 GREEN BAG 2D 159,
168–69 (2012).
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basis for a reasonably accurate account of the Court’s decision-making
process in any given case.
That is not to say that context may not be helpful in examining the
documentary record. For example, the January 1985 memorandum from
Justice White to Justice Brennan quoted by Levine and Wermiel, in
which Justice White refers to “fleeing the city for a week or two” after
circulating his draft calling for the reconsideration of Times v. Sullivan,41
may appear in a somewhat different light if one knows (as Justice
Brennan certainly did) that Justice White generally spent at least a week
skiing in his native Colorado during the long hiatus between the Court’s
early January and late February sittings. (I recall that particular vacation
well, as I used the occasion of Justice White’s absence from chambers to
grow a beard, which I have kept to this day.) Justice Brennan would
have understood Justice White’s comment to be a facetious reference to
his skiing plans, but one that also reflected White’s obvious awareness
that his longtime colleague and friend would be none too pleased by the
draft that shortly followed. Justice White’s personal note to Brennan
warning him of the imminent circulation of the draft is consistent with
his great esteem for Justice Brennan, of whom he invariably spoke in the
most affectionate terms, frequently referring to him as “Billy”—which
Justice Brennan himself once described as “an unusual but quite
agreeable moniker.”42
So far, I have discussed the primary documents on which Wermiel
and Levine rely, but I should also add a word or two about another
source—something between a primary and a secondary source—that
they also use very effectively: the “histories” compiled by the Brennan
clerks. The Brennan histories were, of course, compiled very close in
time to the events they recount, by participants in those events, and they
appear to rely to a large extent on the primary historical record—the
memoranda and drafts that directly record the Justices’ interactions
leading to the issuance of the Court’s opinions. At the same time,
however, the histories are after-the-fact reconstructions, and they rely
not only on the documents, but also on the recollections of the clerks as
well as on second- and third-hand accounts, including, it appears,
information provided by Justice Brennan about what went on in
Conferences and about his interactions with other Justices, as well as
hearsay accounts from other law clerks, containing information that may

41. Levine & Wermiel, supra note 34, at 63.
42. William J. Brennan, “Cheers!” A Tribute to Byron R. White, 1994 BYU L. REV. 209, 225
(1994).
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have been garbled in transmission. As a result, the histories provide
information about some of the oral communications among Justices and
law clerks that are otherwise undocumented and beyond the ken of
history. At the same time, however, that information may not be entirely
accurate.
The histories are also, as Levine and Wermiel’s excerpts indicate,
written from a point of view: that of Brennan and his clerks (actually not
a single point of view, but multiple points of view, though ones that
from the perspective of someone outside the Brennan Chambers usually
though not invariably appeared to be closely aligned). The histories thus
reflected the standpoint of persons who had been directly involved in
and cared deeply about the disagreements within the Court that the
histories discuss. And what the histories say is likely, at times, colored
by their authors’ perspectives, and perhaps by the expectation that the
histories would ultimately be made public (an expectation very different
from that which prevailed in the White Chambers, where preserving a
record for posterity was definitely not among the law clerks’ tasks).
To use one example from Levine and Wermiel’s Article, the Brennan
histories apparently state that during Dun & Bradstreet’s first Term
before the Court, and following Justice White’s circulation of a
memorandum stating that he would await Justice Powell’s anticipated
dissent before deciding whether to join Justice Brennan’s draft opinion
reversing the Vermont Supreme Court, “Brennan’s [C]hambers learned
that White’s own clerks ‘as usual, had no idea what was bothering’ their
Justice.”43
I must say at the outset that I myself have “no idea” whether Justice
White’s law clerks knew what was “bothering” him about Dun &
Bradstreet in early June 1984, or, indeed, whether his law clerks in the
1983 Term generally had any idea what was on his mind with respect to
particular cases. However, given the source, I would recommend that
readers take statements like this one from the Brennan histories with a
grain of salt.
Justice White could certainly be a hard person to read, even for his
law clerks, and his views were at times, though certainly not invariably,
less predictable than those of some of the other Justices seemed to be. In
addition, Justice White, like most other Justices at the time, did not
choose law clerks based on ideological agreement with him (indeed, it
would have been virtually impossible for him to choose law clerks on
that basis, given that hardly anyone coming out of law school at that

43. Levine & Wermiel, supra note 34, at 28.
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time shared Justice White’s particular combination of views), so his law
clerks were not necessarily on the same wavelength as their boss in any
individual case. At the same time, the Justice’s views had a logic to them
if you could figure out his conceptual starting point. And by the time a
case had been briefed and argued, discussed in chambers by the Justice
and all four of his law clerks following argument (as was his practice at
the time), and voted on by the Conference (following which the Justice
would report the vote of the Justices, including his own, to his law
clerks), I generally felt that I had a fairly good idea of the Justice’s views
about the case even though he tended to be fairly closed-mouthed in
explaining them. I expect the same was true of the Justice’s clerks
during the October 1983 Term, all of whom were then, and are now,
extremely able and intelligent.
Having an idea of what was on Justice White’s mind, however, was
not necessarily the same thing as sharing that understanding with law
clerks from other chambers. Unlike Justice Brennan’s law clerks, who
sometimes appeared to act as emissaries for their Justice in
communications with other chambers, Justice White’s law clerks were
generally not expected to negotiate with other chambers over opinions or
to serve as informal messengers expressing his views to his colleagues
on the bench through their own law clerks. When Justice White was
ready to communicate his views to his colleagues, he did so directly, and
usually in writing, not through his law clerks. Justice Brennan’s law
clerks, however, may not have completely understood that Justice
White’s law clerks felt considerably more constrained about purporting
to express their Justice’s views than did the Brennan clerks, and as a
result may have confused a White clerk’s reticence about saying what
was “bothering” Justice White with a lack of understanding.
Thus, I would recommend that readers disregard the “as usual” in the
passage cited by Wermiel and Levine, ascribing it either to
misunderstanding or perhaps mild snarkiness. But as for whether Justice
White’s law clerks in fact knew what was bothering him in this instance
(and again I stress that I have no inside information on the point) it
seems plausible that they did not—not because of some general lack of
insight into Justice White’s mind, but because the record compiled by
Levine and Wermiel strongly suggests that the Justice himself had not
yet come to rest in his thinking about the case.
Why do I say this? All the communications from Justice White that
Levine and Wermiel cite from the relevant time period (late May to early
July 1984), including the oral communications ascribed to Justice White
in the Brennan histories, seem consistent with those of a Justice who was
genuinely, as he stated in his June 25, 1984, memorandum, “up in the
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air.”44 The memoranda and conversations described by the authors
suggest that although Justice White was inclined to want to join Justice
Powell in affirming, he did not see a satisfactory way of doing so
consistent with the Court’s precedents, which, as his tentative draft
concurring statement indicated, were more consistent with reversal than
affirmance.45 Even Justice White’s suggestion of reargument seems
strangely formless, as it does not appear to have indicated exactly what
issue he wanted to have reargued. That matter, according to the
documentary record, was left to Justices Brennan and Powell to
negotiate,46 and the questions that they came up with certainly did not
encompass the issue Justice White ultimately focused on the next
Term—whether Gertz and even Times v. Sullivan were correctly
decided. Had Justice White already decided that that was the nub of the
case, the suggestion that the case be reargued on other issues would have
made little sense.
The bottom line here is that the Brennan histories, in this particular
instance, may or may not be accurate in detail (as to whether Justice
White’s law clerks in fact had any idea what was bothering him about
the case in June 1984), but they appear to reflect accurately that Justice
White’s unsettled position was a source of confusion and consternation
in Justice Brennan’s Chambers. The broader lesson is that the histories
are most useful as a reflection of Justice Brennan’s and his law clerks’
perspectives; beyond that, they help fill out the primary documentary
record but should not be taken as gospel to the extent that they purport to
recount the words or doings of other Justices. And as Levine and
Wermiel’s Article shows, checking the histories against the documentary
record, especially the part that is preserved in the collections of other
contemporary Justices, may reveal instances in which the law clerks who
wrote the histories had imperfect or incomplete knowledge.47
III. DUN & BRADSTREET’S PLACE IN THE COURT’S
JURISPRUDENCE
Finally, I offer a few words about the merits and significance of Dun
& Bradstreet itself. Justice White’s advocacy of a grant of certiorari and
the Court’s eventual acquiescence following his circulation of a draft
dissent from denial do not appear terribly surprising. The Vermont
44. Levine & Wermiel, supra note 34, at 36–37.
45. Id. at 37.
46. Id. at 39–40.
47. Id. at 71, n.423.
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Supreme Court’s decision to withhold Gertz’s First Amendment-based
protections from a non-media defendant sued for libel seemed
inconsistent with the Court’s general unwillingness to grant different
First Amendment protections to the media, even if it was not necessarily
foreclosed by the Court’s existing libel precedents. As Justice White’s
draft dissent from denial suggested, whether such an exception for nonmedia defendants should be crafted was an issue “appropriate for
consideration by th[e] Court because of [its] implications for First
Amendment jurisprudence as a whole.”48
Once the Court took the case, however, its problematic nature became
apparent. The nature of the “speech” involved—the sale of commercial
credit information about businesses—evidently appeared to many of the
Justices to differentiate it from the speech that Times v. Sullivan, and
even Gertz, were designed to protect. Dun & Bradstreet’s credit
reporting hardly seemed as central to the interests of the First
Amendment as reporting about controversial actions by public figures.
(It is an interesting mark of how times have changed that conservative
Justices in 1984–85 questioned whether such sales of information
merited much First Amendment protection, while their conservative
heirs on today’s Court seem to take precisely the opposite view.)49
Credit reporting also is a particularly robust form of speech because of
its profitability; it involves information that is readily confirmed as true
or false with the exercise of due care; and false reports have great
potential to cause harm. And the application of Gertz to such speech
raised concerns among at least some of the Justices about whether the
Fair Credit Reporting Act, which provides for both presumed and
punitive damages for “willful” false credit reports,50 would satisfy
Gertz’s requirement that presumed or punitive damages may be imposed
only on proof of “actual malice” in the Times v. Sullivan sense.51
But the Court had written itself into a corner. Each of the potential
ways of distinguishing Dun & Bradstreet from Gertz ran smack-dab into
precedent. The Vermont Supreme Court’s media/non-media distinction
seemed directly contrary to the Supreme Court’s repeated insistence that
the media has no greater First Amendment protection than non-media

48. Id. at 13 (citation omitted).
49. I refer to Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011), where the Court held
that a prohibition on the sale of prescription data to marketers and data miners violated the First
Amendment.
50. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (1976).
51. Levine & Wermiel, supra note 34, at 10, 20, 21.
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speakers.52 The possibility that the sale of credit information might be
defined as “commercial speech” entitled to a lesser degree of First
Amendment protection did not fully jibe with existing definitions of
commercial speech—speech proposing a commercial transaction, or,
essentially, advertising—and expanding the category could pose difficult
line-drawing problems.53 And the remaining possibility, limiting First
Amendment protection because the speech in question did not concern a
matter of public interest, ran afoul of Gertz, where Justice Powell had
pooh-poohed the notion that the degree of First Amendment protection
afforded to speech could depend on a public interest test.54
All this was of little concern to a Justice, like Brennan, who was
principally interested in defending Times v. Sullivan against any further
inroads (and for whom Gertz itself was bad enough).55 But for a Justice
inclined to think that the kind of speech at issue in Dun & Bradstreet
should not receive protection even under the Gertz standard, the path
forward was more difficult. There were two basic ways of affirming the
outcome reached by the Vermont Supreme Court: overruling one or
more precedents (most likely Gertz), or tacking on a conceptually
incoherent exception to Gertz—conceptually incoherent because it
would involve acceptance of some proposition that had been rejected
either in Gertz or some other precedent of the Court.
Conceptual incoherence was a preferred modus operandi of the
Burger Court—limiting precedents (especially Warren Court ones)
without overruling them56—and Dun & Bradstreet was no exception.
For Powell, of course, overruling Gertz, his own handiwork, was out of
the question, so he was condemned, even as he fought a more serious,
and courageous, battle with cancer, to a months-long task of squaring the
circle: maintaining Gertz, which was premised on the idea that whether
speech concerned a matter of public interest was not a proper
consideration in determining the First Amendment protection to which it
was entitled, while cobbling on an exception to Gertz’s limits on
presumed and punitive damages for, you guessed it, speech not
concerning a matter of public interest.

52. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 782 (1978); Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S. 817 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
53. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985).
54. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974).
55. See id. at 361 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
56. Charles Fried, attacking the Burger Court from the right, commented that this practice “piled
incoherence on incoherence.” Charles Fried, Foreword: Revolutions?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 13, 76
(1995).
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Powell’s course involved a considerable degree of self-deception.
Having thoroughly constitutionalized the law of libel in Gertz, he now
presented himself as the champion of defending the common law against
constitutionally based incursions—an irony that, according to the
Brennan histories cited by Levine and Wermiel, had elicited a tart
comment from Justice Rehnquist in one of the final Conferences where
the Justices discussed the case in the 1983 Term.57 And even while
purporting to defend the common law, Justice Powell apparently
considered using the case to advance his pet project of defending
corporate America by limiting punitive damages generally, not just in
libel actions but in common-law tort actions generally.58 Powell’s dream
was ahead of its time, as the limits on punitive damages he already
contemplated in 1985 did not come to fruition for another decade, when
a coalition of moderate and conservative Justices discovered due process
limits on punitive damages, over the objection of the Court’s more
principled conservatives and one liberal.59
The documentary record compiled by Levine and Wermiel suggests
that for Justice White, the incoherence of the effort to reconcile
affirmance with the Court’s precedents was a sticking point, accounting
for his apparent initial vote to reverse and his proposed terse
concurrence in the judgment if the case were not reargued, which would
have said simply that reversal was more consistent with the Court’s
existing precedents than affirmance.60 At the same time, his lingering
disagreement with Gertz and what were by his own account growing
doubts about the wisdom of Times v. Sullivan itself appear to have
inclined Justice White to want to look for a defensible approach that
could lead to affirmance of the Vermont Supreme Court’s judgment—an
approach he seems to have found lacking in Powell’s drafts both in the
1983 Term and the 1984 Term. And perhaps Justice Brennan, by seizing
the opportunity to write a broad paean to Times v. Sullivan and the First
Amendment rather than a more spare this-is-what-our-precedents-require
opinion (which would arguably have been more suitable for a case
presenting such a narrow issue and involving such uninspiring facts),61
drew out the contrarian in Justice White and led him to press for a
57. Levine & Wermiel, supra note 34, at 39.
58. Id. at 42–44, 55, 59–60. After his retirement, Justice Powell publicly expressed his views on
punitive damages. Lewis Powell, The Bizarre Results of Punitive Damages, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8,
1995, at A21.
59. See BMW of N. Am., Inc., v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
60. Levine & Wermiel, supra note 34, at 37.
61. Id. at 26.
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reargument that, he apparently hoped, would result in a better airing of
the question whether there was a more principled basis for limiting
Gertz.
Reargument appears to have left White back where he started,
however, with no better rationale for limiting Gertz apparent. That
would seemingly account for his reported vote following reargument in
the 1984 Term (according to the Brennan histories) to reverse unless the
Court was prepared to overrule Gertz, which no other Justice was
evidently willing to do.62 With support that grudging from his fifth vote,
Justice Brennan, the great master at “counting to five,” might have been
wise to scale back the opinion he had circulated the previous spring, but
as the documentary record shows, he did not.63 It seems possible (and
again I am only speculating here) that the unpalatability of joining an
encomium to opinions he disliked was one of the factors that pushed
Justice White over the edge and led him to circulate his opinion
advocating that Gertz be overruled and describing Times v. Sullivan
itself as “improvident.”64
It is contrary to the Supreme Court’s normal practice to overrule
decisions when no party has asked the Court to do so and the Court itself
has not invited briefing or argument on the issue.65 Outside those
circumstances, Justices usually, but not invariably, put aside their
objections to decisions they disagreed with when issued and accept them
as binding precedents, even if they may seek to narrow and distinguish
them. Justice White normally played by those rules, but as a number of
his opinions and votes from around the time of Dun & Bradstreet
indicate, he was quite willing to join in, or to advocate, overruling
decisions with which he strongly disagreed, whether that disagreement
was longstanding or recently developed.
In the 1984 Term itself, White joined the majority in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority in overruling National League
of Cities v. Usery,66 a decision from which he had dissented when it was
issued.67 In the “moment of silence” case, Wallace v. Jaffree, he
described himself as “out of step” with the Court’s Establishment Clause
jurisprudence and called for a “basic reconsideration of [the Court’s]
62. Id. at 48–49.
63. Id. at 52.
64. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 774, 767 (1985) (White, J.,
dissenting).
65. See, e.g., Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635 (2009).
66. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
67. Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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precedents” in the area,68 a view he repeated in his dissenting statement
in Grand Rapids v. Ball and Aguilar v. Felton.69 The next term, he issued
a strident call for overruling Roe v. Wade70 in his dissent in Thornburgh
v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists.71 And in Batson
v. Kentucky,72 he joined the Court in overruling his own opinion in
Swain v. Alabama,73 which had prevented criminal defendants from
challenging prosecutors’ racially discriminatory exercise of peremptory
challenges in individual cases. In a concurring statement, he
acknowledged that Swain had led to a situation in which “the practice of
peremptorily eliminating blacks from petit juries in cases with black
defendants remains widespread,” and agreed that “the time has come” to
overrule it.74
In short, Justice White was not shy about saying he thought an
opinion should be overruled, even when he had joined it at the time it
was first issued, as he had joined Times v. Sullivan. Thus, it is not
terribly surprising that he eventually decided that even though the Court
was not prepared to overrule Gertz, he would ultimately base his vote on
the view that the case should be overruled, contrary to the position he
had apparently expressed in Conference. And because the disagreement
he had with Gertz was, fundamentally, a disagreement with the approach
of Times v. Sullivan itself, it is equally unsurprising that he would aim
much of his opinion at that decision.
Even so, it is worth noting that while criticizing Times v. Sullivan,
saying that it struck an “improvident balance,”75 and suggesting
alternative ways of limiting libel law to protect First Amendment values
that he thought preferable to the Times standard, he stopped short of
explicitly calling for the Court to overrule Times v. Sullivan—unlike
Gertz, which he stated “should be overruled.”76 That even an opinion
that otherwise took direct aim at Times v. Sullivan shied away from
calling for its overruling may indicate how firmly the decision had

68. 472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985) (White, J., dissenting).
69. 473 U.S. 373, 400 (1985) (White, J., dissenting) (dissenting from both Grand Rapids v. Ball
and Aguilar v. Felton).
70. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
71. 476 U.S. 747, 785–86 (1986) (White, J., dissenting).
72. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
73. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
74. Batson, 476 U.S. at 100–02 (White, J., concurring).
75. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 767 (1985) (White, J.,
concurring).
76. Id. at 774.
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become entrenched by 1985.
Indeed, the most striking thing about Justice White’s quixotic assault
on Gertz and Times v. Sullivan was how little traction it gained
elsewhere on the Court. Apart from Chief Justice Burger’s effort to join
both Justice Powell in endorsing Gertz and Justice White in trashing it,77
no other Justice expressed any interest in fundamentally rethinking the
Court’s approach to libel and the First Amendment—not even Justice
Rehnquist, the Justice on the Court at the time who was ostensibly the
most averse to limiting state law through adventurous constitutional
holdings. Justice White’s protest only highlighted the broad consensus
on the Court in favor of Times v. Sullivan and even, remarkably, what
Rehnquist is said to have referred to as the “last minute compromise” of
Gertz.78 In light of that consensus, Justice Stevens was undoubtedly wise
to counsel Justice Brennan not to react defensively, especially not with a
defense that seemed “less persuasive” than Times v. Sullivan itself.79
And Justice Brennan was wise to take that advice, notwithstanding his
initial inclination to mount a full defense of Times v. Sullivan proceeding
from “Meiklejohnian premises”80 (a phrase that sounds much more like
it came from a Brennan clerk than from Brennan himself).
The extent to which Times v. Sullivan and its progeny had already
won, despite Justice White’s lone protest, was illustrated the very next
term, when a majority of the Court (including Dun & Bradstreet’s
supposedly staunch defenders of state law, Justices Powell and
O’Connor) added yet another limitation on the operation of common-law
libel in Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, holding that the First
Amendment requires libel plaintiffs in cases involving speech on
subjects of public concern to bear the burden of proving falsity as well
as the requisite degree of fault.81 (Interestingly, it was Justice Stevens,
joined by White, Burger, and Rehnquist, who spearheaded the dissent to
that holding.)82
And that same term, Justice White gave libel defendants one of their
greatest victories in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,83 which held that a
court considering a summary judgment motion in a libel case must
consider whether there is an issue of fact for the jury in light of the
77. Levine & Wermiel, supra note 34, at 86–87.
78. Id. at 19 (citation omitted).
79. Id. at 83 (citation omitted).
80. Id. at 66 (citation omitted).
81. Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986).
82. Id. at 780 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
83. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
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standard of proof required under Times v. Sullivan: clear and convincing
evidence. The decision, which confers a tremendous procedural
advantage on libel defendants, obviously reflects Justice White’s
understanding of the logic of the summary judgment standard rather than
great sympathy for the First Amendment defenses of accused libelers.
Ironically, Justice Brennan dissented based on his views about
preserving jury trial rights in civil cases; Justice Rehnquist also
dissented, joined by Chief Justice Burger.84 Nowhere in any of the
decisions was there any suggestion that the Times v. Sullivan standard
was anything other than firmly entrenched law.
Indeed, once Justice White got his feelings about Times v. Sullivan off
his chest in Dun & Bradstreet, they never reappeared in any subsequent
opinion he wrote or joined, despite ample opportunities presented by
later decisions involving libel. And with one minor exception, those
criticisms were never taken up by any other Justices—the sole exception
being a dissent from denial of certiorari written by Chief Justice Burger
and joined by Justice Rehnquist near the end of the 1985 Term, which
called for the reexamination of Times v. Sullivan.85 Notably, Justice
White did not join that dissent, although it invoked his opinion in Dun &
Bradstreet.
Since 1986, the Court’s relatively few forays into the area of
defamation law have involved the working out of details, with the
assumption that Times v. Sullivan and Gertz provide the governing
principles.86 Beyond the area of defamation, Times v. Sullivan’s tribute
to our “profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” has
achieved iconic stature in the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence
and is regularly invoked by Justices across the ideological spectrum.87
Not even Justice Scalia, who is reputed to have said that he regards
Times v. Sullivan as wrongly decided,88 has ever expressed that thought
in an opinion since his appointment to the Court. Indeed, he joined the
Court in extending the Times v. Sullivan standard to claims of intentional

84. Id. at 257 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 268 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
85. Coughlin v. Westinghouse Broad. & Cable, Inc., 476 U.S. 1187 (1986) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
86. See, e.g., Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (1991); Harte-Hanks
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989).
87. See, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 467–68 (2007) (Roberts, C.J.,
announcing the opinion of the Court).
88. Levine & Wermiel, supra note 34, at 3–4.
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infliction of emotional distress in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,89
and he has repeatedly joined opinions that are premised on the holding
of Times v. Sullivan or that cite it favorably.90 Justice Scalia’s opinion
for the Court in District of Columbia v. Heller91 even invoked Times v.
Sullivan as precedent for the proposition that there is nothing illegitimate
about the Court’s discovery of the scope of a constitutional amendment
two centuries after its adoption: “Even a question as basic as the scope
of proscribable libel,” he wrote, “was not addressed by this Court until
1964, nearly two centuries after the founding.”92
In short, Times v. Sullivan continues to tower over the fields of libel
law and First Amendment jurisprudence generally, and its continued
hegemony is not in serious doubt. Dun & Bradstreet, by contrast, is a
footnote (albeit a fairly important one in its limited area of operation).
My interpretation of the record compiled by Levine and Wermiel is that
the case never truly called into question the continued vitality of Times
v. Sullivan in anyone’s mind except Justice White’s (and, in response,
Justice Brennan’s and his clerks’). The only real continuing importance
of Justice White’s opinion is that it was so ineffectual as to confirm
rather than undermine Times v. Sullivan’s vitality.
Levine and Wermiel have provided a fascinating and useful case
study of how the history of a Supreme Court decision can be traced in
detail through the papers made available to the public by the former
Justices of the Court. But Dun & Bradstreet also illustrates that
sometimes the Justices’ footnote wars are less important than they may
seem from the standpoint of the particular Justices and law clerks who
are directly involved. The wealth of detail now available about the
drafting of any one set of opinions should not lead students of the Court
to miss the forest for the trees.

89. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
90. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Masson, 501 U.S. at 525 (White, J.,
joined by Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
91. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
92. Id. at 626 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).

